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ABSTRACT: This paper assesses the impacts of minority representation on judicial decisionmaking within three-judge panels on the Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals. While much
of the existing literature regarding this issue has looked at racial and gender minorities in the federal
judiciary, this paper seeks to identify whether the presence of foreign-born judges on appellate
panels has an effect on the holdings of immigration-related cases. To address this question, I
compiled an original database of 200 immigration cases decided between 2016 and 2020. The
results reaffirm previous findings that panels with at least one female judge or judge of color are
more likely to vote in favor of immigrant appellants. However, contrary to theoretical expectations,
the results find that foreign-born judges were not more likely to vote in favor of immigrant
appellants, signaling that the identity of being an immigrant may not have as strong of a predictive
value on judicial decision-making as race or gender. This has broad implications for how we
understand the role of different identities in shaping case outcomes in the U.S. Court of Appeals.

Introduction
The judicial branch of the United States government is its most objective.1 Unlike the
chambers of Congress or the President, federal judges are meant to make decisions independent of
personal or political pressures; rather than passing laws, their job is to apply the law correctly
based on the facts of a case.2 However, a growing body of research into judicial decision-making
suggests that judges do not always vote objectively. Scholars have found that certain factors —
namely the race and gender of judges within appellate panels — can influence case decisions.3,4
Controversy over this issue arose in 2016, when then-President Donald Trump claimed that U.S.
District Judge Gonzalo Curiel should not have presided over a case involving Trump University
because his Mexican heritage presented an “absolute conflict.” 5 Since Trump was advocating to
build a wall on the U.S.-Mexican border at the time, he asserted that the judge would harbor an
unfair bias towards him during legal proceedings. In the end, Judge Gonzalo Curiel remained on
the lawsuit’s panel and would go on to rule in Trump’s favor to stop a lawsuit aimed at blocking
the border wall’s construction. 6 While Trump’s remarks were deemed racist by many, the situation
begs the question: Do personal identities influence judicial decision-making?
In this section, I summarize the existing literature surrounding the effects of minority
representation on the federal bench. Despite criticisms about the objectivity of minority judges,
researchers have only found persistent differences in case decisions when the identities of minority
judges substantively relate to the issues at hand. To illustrate this, Boyd, Epstein, and Martin
(2010) performed a comprehensive analysis of the effect of judges’ gender on case outcomes
across 13 areas of law. They did not find gender effects in any area of law besides cases of sex
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discrimination, in which female judges were more likely to side with plaintiffs. 7 This suggests that
a general pro-plaintiff or otherwise liberal attitude among female judges is not driving gender
differences in voting behaviors, but rather, the content of sex discrimination cases specifically
elicits different responses in male and female judges.
Since the focus of this paper is on the U.S. Court of Appeals, my research must properly
account for its institutional features. While some studies have assessed differences in individual
voting behaviors between minority and nonminority judges, these individual effects cannot explain
Court of Appeals outcomes because federal appellate panels do not operate by having judges
decide cases on their own. 8 Instead, judges in the Court of Appeals deliberate together in panels of
three and must come to a unanimous decision about a case’s holding. Research shows that minority
representation on appellate panels impacts judicial decisions both at the individual and panel level.
That is, not only are individual female judges more likely to vote in favor of appellants alleging
sex discrimination, but panels that include at least one female judge are also more likely to vote in
favor of these appellants.9,10 Similarly, Black judges and panels with Black judges are more likely
to vote pro-appellant in cases of racial discrimination and affirmative action. 11,12 In discussing
appellate panels, it is also important to note their institutional norm of consensus. An
overwhelming majority of cases are decided with consensus; only around 6-8% of cases include a
dissent opinion from one of the co-panelist judges. 13 However, the low percentage of dissents does
not fully capture the amount of disagreement within panels — judges do not always dissent when
they disagree with their co-panelists because there are costs associated with doing so. 14 For
example, dissenting can undermine the federal judiciary’s sense of legitimacy and perceived
objectivity. Additionally, writing a dissent can ostracize a judge from their colleagues and create
a fruitless workload for them. Therefore, judges in disagreement are often compelled to align
themselves with the majority opinion and vote differently than they might otherwise have, making
it difficult to determine whether judges voted in accordance with their true views.
Most of the scholarship on judicial decision-making in the Court of Appeals has been
concerned with race and gender. As a result, previous studies have mainly looked at the effects of
minority representation on cases of sex and race discrimination. By contrast, very few studies have
examined the influence of minority judge characteristics on cases related to immigration. One such
study on immigration cases from 1999-2009 explored whether panels with judges of color and
female judges systematically voted more pro-immigrant. The researchers found that consistent
with previous studies, panels with at least one female judge voted more pro-immigrant than their
all-male counterparts.15 However, the same study also found that panels with at least one judge of
color were more anti-immigration than their all-white counterparts. The authors suggest that this
finding could have arisen because judges of color were less sympathetic to “claims made by people
who have entered the country illegally” or because “they are cognizant of the scrutiny they are
under in deciding these cases.” 16 In my view, this also suggests that immigration cases are not
substantively related to the racial identities of minority judges, so I turn my focus instead to
foreign-born judges, whose relationship to immigration cases parallels that of female judges and
judges of color to sex and race discrimination cases.
Taken together, the literature on judicial diversity suggests that panels with racial and
gender minority judges increase the likelihood of a case outcome being pro-appellant. However,
in reviewing these studies, I found that there was a dearth of research into the panel effects of
foreign-born judges in the Court of Appeals. Part of this problem is likely due to the fact that
foreign-born judges are underrepresented in the circuit courts. Currently, the U.S. is home to
roughly 44.7 million immigrants or around 13.7% of the national population. 17 In states covered
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by the Ninth Circuit, the immigrant population is even higher than the national average because
they harbor some of the nation’s most popular airports and immigrants tend to concentrate near
gateway ports of entry in their cities. 18 By contrast, only 2 out of the 29 sitting judges (6.8%) on
the Ninth Circuit court are foreign-born.19* The underrepresentation of immigrant judges has
especially worrisome implications in the Ninth Circuit, since around 40% of all cases heard in its
courts are related to immigration.20 Women, people of color, LGBTQ+ people, and religious
minorities are also underrepresented in the Court of Appeals compared to their representation in
the U.S. population, and this issue has increased with the recent judicial appointees. 21 For example,
women comprise 30% of circuit court seats although they are 50.52% of the U.S. population;
Hispanics comprise 7% of seats although they are 13% of the population; Blacks comprise 11%
of seats although they are 13% of the population; etc. 22 In discussing diversity in the federal
judiciary, I must highlight the difference between the descriptive representation that I have just
described and substantive representation. 23 Descriptive representation relates to being represented
by judges who have the same demographic characteristics as the population. On the other hand,
substantive representation relates to being represented by judges who hold the same opinions and
views as the population. While these terms have some overlap in that judges who share
demographic characteristics with a population may hold the same beliefs as them, minorities are
certainly not a monolith and cannot be assumed to have one set of views, even in areas of law that
are salient to their identities.
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit’s diversity has gone through a shift in recent years. During
Trump’s presidency, he filled 10 vacancies in the Ninth Circuit court alone. 24 This effectively
flipped the composition of the court, which had long been hailed for its commitment to diversity
ever since Jimmy Carter’s 1970 initiative to appoint minority judges to the federal judiciary. 25 As
of January 2021, a third of the 29 sitting judges on the nation’s traditionally most liberal court
were right leaning Trump appointees. Of Trump’s picks, there were 2 Asian men, one of whom
was born outside of the U.S., and 2 White women. The rest were White men.
In response both to the gap in the literature and the pressing need for more representation
of foreign-born judges in the federal judiciary, I narrowed the focus of my research to answer the
following question: Do Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panels with at least one foreign-born judge
vote differently from panels with all U.S.-born judges on immigration cases? Although the existing
literature affirms that minority panel effects are present, scholars have struggled to ascertain why.
The next section covers theoretical expectations in an attempt to identify potential causal
mechanisms that may be driving these effects on the federal bench.
Theoretical Expectations
In order to properly interpret my research, it is crucial to understand why previous studies
find that panels with minority judges vote differently than those without. In this section, I discuss
three theoretical explanations, which provide psychological insight into the impact of diversity on
judicial decision-making. They help provide an account for why we might predict that panels with
minority judges, specifically foreign-born judges, will vote more pro-appellant in immigration
cases.
Norm of Consensus
Fischman (2011) states that due to the collaborative nature of appellate panels, judges do
not always vote sincerely. 26 Rather, they conform to the norm of consensus in the federal judiciary
by voting against their own views in favor of the views of the majority. Under this logic, the panelDartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 8
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level effects of judicial diversity may be the result of nonminority judges believing that they will
not be able to change the vote(s) of their minority co-panelist(s). Thus, they would side with their
co-panelists in order to preserve unanimity and avoid the minority judge filing a dissent. This
explanation reflects an endogenous effect because the outcome (vote) for one individual affects
the outcomes of their co-panelists.27 In this way, we expect that minority judges will shift the range
for a consensus view and the presence of a minority judge who holds more pro-appellant attitudes
will predictably increase the likelihood that the panel will hold pro-appellant.28
Learning Through Exposure
Pursuant to previous literature on learning theories, I submit that as people learn about
others’ lived experiences, they adjust their own views to incorporate this new information. For
example, one study showed that pro-White sentiments among White Americans decreased during
and following the Black Lives Matter Movement in 2018, which the researchers posit was due to
exposure to media content highlighting Black American stories about being targets of police
brutality and racism. 29 In another study, researchers postulated that male judges with daughters
vote more pro-feminist because prior to having children, they were unaware of women’s issues
and better understood those issues when they had a daughter who was experiencing them. 30 This
logic theoretically extends to judicial appellate panels because the first-hand experiences of female
judges, judges of color, and foreign-born judges can be shared with their white, male U.S.-born
co-panelists during case deliberation. 31 As a result of learning through exposure, this suggests that
the co-panelists would adopt more pro-appellant attitudes in gender and racial discrimination
cases, as well as immigration cases. African American D.C. Judge Harry Edwards affirmed this
idea in 2002, stating that:
“If I bring unique perspectives to judicial problems — perspectives that are mine in whole
or in part because I am Black — it is a good thing… because it is inevitable that judges’
different professional and life experiences have some bearing on how they confront various
problems that come before them. And in a judicial environment in which collegial
deliberations are fostered, diversity among the judges makes for better-informed
discussion.”32
In the context of this study, the literature implies that foreign-born judges who have gone through
the immigration courts would be able to expose U.S.-born judges to first-hand accounts of the
immigrant experience and foster more positive attitudes towards immigrant appellants. For
example, Carlos Bea, a Ninth Circuit judge who was born in Spain, told his story of immigrating
to America and how he was nearly deported by an immigration court as a young college student.
In a 2007 address to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), he said:
“Every immigrant has a story. You see before you an immigrant who was once under an
order of deportation…We are a nation of immigrants and the subject is a vital one for all
of us. Every time an Albert Einstein invents a theory, an Arnold Schwarzenegger becomes
a Governor, or a rookie Hispanic judge writes a dissent, I am reminded that immigrants
aren’t just a previous generation long gone, they are an ever-changing contribution to our
society, which really is a melting pot.”33
Moderation
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Lastly, it is possible that the presence of minority judges on appellate panels causes
nonminority judges to moderate their anti-appellant views.34 For example, a panel of three U.S.born judges may bring up arguments or display attitudes that are anti-immigrant because either
they believe that their U.S.-born co-panelists will agree with them or they believe that there will
not be strong opposition associated with expressing their views. However, if an immigrant judge
were on that same panel, we could expect that a judge who would otherwise express antiimmigration views might adjust their speech to not incur the social cost of offending a colleague.
Studies of social psychology bolster this claim, finding that in the case of racial biases, White
Americans use social tuning in interracial interactions by exhibiting less prejudice in the presence
of Blacks than in the presence of other Whites. 35 Researchers postulate that this is because the
participants shifted their behaviors in order to not appear biased to those around them. If a judge’s
anti-appellant views were moderated by the presence of a judge who shares an identity with the
appellant, then we might expect them to concede the case and side with the minority judge.
Data and Methods
My data consists of a random sample of 200 immigration-related cases decided in the Ninth
Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals between 2016-2020. Through Westlaw,36 a legal research
website, I conducted an advanced search request that narrowed down all Ninth Circuit cases with
the date range from January 1st of 2016 to September 18th of 2020, which was the day that I began
collecting my data. Having a date range from the last four years was of particular interest to me
because of the political climate surrounding President Trump’s immigration policy, as well as the
shifting composition of the Ninth Circuit court to be more conservative. 37
I chose to only focus on immigration cases because the existing literature suggests that the
impacts of minority representation on judicial outcomes is found most consistently in cases related
to an area of law that is relevant to the judges’ identities. Since the novel approach of my paper is
examining foreign-born judges as minorities in the federal judiciary, I felt that immigration cases
were most parallel to studies on female judges in sex discrimination cases or Black judges in racial
discrimination cases. I decided to concentrate my research on cases only within the Ninth Circuit
because its courts have such a large immigration caseload and a high rate of immigration into its
states (Montana, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, Alaska, Hawaii, and California)
compared to other circuits.38 Using Westlaw, I further narrowed my search to cases that fall under
the category of “Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship.” I manually excluded cases in which the
U.S. government was one of the litigants. This left all of the cases included in my dataset with the
two litigants being the case’s immigrant appellant and one of the U.S. Attorneys General as the
appellee. During my date range, the Attorneys General were William Barr, Jeff Sessions, Loretta
Lynch, and Matthew Whitaker. After employing the exclusion criteria, there were 285 remaining
cases, of which I used a random number generator to select 200 cases for analysis.
My dataset focused on panel-level judicial decisions, as opposed to the voting records of
individual judges. This decision was made in part because, institutionally, the U.S. Court of
Appeals has a norm of consensus in which all decisions must be made with approval of all three
judges on a panel except in cases where one judge dissents. While it is possible to use dissents as
a proxy for individual votes, my dataset included only 15 dissents out of 200 cases. Since each
case has three votes — one per panelist — there were 15 dissents out of 600 votes, which was too
small a sample to be able to perform comprehensive statistical analysis on. This would likely not
have a strong impact on my research focus because, of the 15 dissent votes, I found only one case
in which an immigrant judge dissented. 39*
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Using Excel, I coded for 28 distinct variables. The outcome variable for my research
purposes was the holding of each case, which I coded as a gradient based on how favorable the
outcome was towards the immigrant appellant. In Court of Appeals cases, the panel may decide in
favor of the immigrant appellant by affirming their petition to be reconsidered by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), an independent administrative agency. In my codebook, a holding of
(0) indicates that the appellant’s petition was fully denied or denied in part and dismissed in part
by the panel; a (1) indicates that the petition was granted in part and denied or dismissed in part; a
(2) indicates that the petition was fully granted. I used this gradient as opposed to a binary variable
in order to capture the nuance of the holdings and account for the large number of cases that were
upheld in part and denied in part.
My key variable of interest was whether or not each judge on a panel was born in the U.S.
(U.S.-born = 0; foreign-born = 1). To identify which judges were foreign-born and which were
U.S.-born, I collected information directly from the Federal Judiciary Center (FJC), which
provides publicly accessible bios that include the birthplace of every federal judge.40 Further, FJC
bios include data on the U.S. president that nominated each judge. I used the party of the
nominating president as a proxy for the partisan affiliations of each judge (Republican = 0;
Democrat = 1). I collected information on race/ethnicity (White = 0; Hispanic = 1; Asian = 2;
Black = 3; Middle Eastern = 4; Native American = 5) and gender (Male = 0; Female = 1) based on
my personal assessment of Google images and the surnames of each judge. Although the accuracy
of my assessment may have limitations, this method is most often used for judicial research since
federal judge’s race and gender identities are not explicitly listed on any official websites.
I also included a variable for the national origin of each immigrant appellant in my dataset.
There is robust evidence that not all immigrants are treated or viewed the same — Americans have
for decades viewed immigration from European countries more favorably, especially compared to
immigration from Latin America and Asia.41 Even in the federal judiciary there are large disparities
in rates of asylum petitions being granted depending on which country they are from. 42 Westlaw
includes the national origin of the appellant in its case reviews because they are relevant to the
immigration case proceedings. Using this information, I created a variable to categorize appellants
based on what region their country of origin is belongs to (Europe = 0; Latin America = 1; East
Asia = 2; Middle East = 3; Africa = 4).
After collecting this data, I used RStudio to create dummy variables to catalogue cases
based on whether the presiding panel had one immigrant judge, two immigrant judges, or no
immigrant judges, as well as the panels’ number of female judges, judges of color, and Democrat
judges. I then performed two logistic regression tests of panels’ decisions in immigration cases.
The U.S. Court of Appeals randomizes assignment of judges to cases, so randomization in my data
can be assumed.43
Before discussing my results, it is useful to address the descriptive statistics of my dataset.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of regional origins among immigrant appellants. The majority of
appellants came from Latin America (61%) with appellants from Europe being the least
represented group (6%). Figures 2-4 show the distributions of judges’ race, gender and party
affiliation, respectively. The low representation of panels with three judges of color (1.5%), three
female judges (1.5%), and three Republican judges (3%) is consistent with the makeup of judges
in the Ninth Circuit, which is overwhelmingly made up of white male Democrats. Figures
demonstrating panel composition are more useful to view in the context of my research than the
composition of all judges included in my dataset, since my research interest is in panel-level
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effects. A more comprehensive empirical model for different panel composition combinations can
be found in Appendix Table A1.
Figure 2: Racial Distribution of
Appeals Panels

Figure 1: Appellant' National Origin by
Region
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Figure 3: Gender Distribution of Appeals
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Figure 4: Party Distribution of
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Additionally, I found that 24% of immigration cases had at least one foreign-born judge
presiding. There were only 3 cases in which two foreign-born judges presided (1.5%) and none in
which three foreign-born judges presided, which I did not include in my analysis or discussion due
to the small sample size. Furthermore, my data includes 90 unique judges, 29 of whom are sitting
members of the Ninth Circuit court and 61 of whom are members of other district courts that were
randomly selected to preside in Ninth Circuit cases. This includes a total of 11 foreign-born judges
in my dataset, 2 of whom currently serve on the Ninth Circuit and 2 of whom recently retired from
the Ninth Circuit. All of the foreign-born judges in my dataset are now American citizens. Of the
11 immigrant judges: 5 were Hispanic, 2 were White, 2 were Asian, and 1 was Black; 5 were
nominated by a Republican and 6 were nominated by a Democrat; 9 were men and 2 were women.
Although there are more Democrat-appointed immigrant judges in my data, Republican-appointed
immigrant judges presided over twice as many cases.
Results
To answer the central question of this paper — whether panels with at least one immigrant
judge vote differently from panels with no immigrant judges — I report the voting records of
panels based on the presence of minority judges. Figure 5 provides a graph of the raw data on total
holdings that were fully granted, granted in part/denied in part, and fully denied among all panelDartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 8
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types. Since I coded case outcomes on a gradient with 0 (appeal fully denied) being the most antiimmigrant and 2 (appeal fully granted) being the most pro-immigrant, this figure shows that
regardless of panel composition, panels were more likely to vote anti-immigrant.

Figure 5: Panels' Total Holdings
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Using the incidence of each holding across different panel-types, Table 1 shows that the
mean holding in all cases was 0.535, which skews anti-immigrant appellant. Table 1 also
demonstrates that panels with at least one minority judge voted more pro-immigrant than the
average. The increase in mean holding for panels with at least one immigrant judge, which was
my principal interest, is +0.048. By contrast, panels’ mean vote with at least one female judge is
+0.066 higher than the average and panels with at least one judge of color is highest at +0.106
higher than the average, meaning that the smallest difference in means was among panels with a
foreign-born judge and the greatest difference in means was among panels with a racial minority
judge.
Table 1: Panels with Minorities’ Mean Holdings in Immigration Cases (2016-2020)

All

At Least One
Immigrant Judge

At Least One
Female Judge

At Least One
Judge of
Color

0.535

0.583

0.601

0.641

Table 2: Nonminority Panels’ Mean Holdings in Immigration Cases (2016-2020)
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All

Three U.S.-born
Judges

0.535

0.5197

Three
Male Judges
0.387

Three White
Judges
0.347

To examine the difference in means, I recreated Table 1 using the mean holdings of panels
with all nonminority judges. Table 2 shows that panels with all nonminority judges had more antiimmigrant holdings than the average across characteristics. I found that panels with all U.S.-born
judges had a decrease in mean holding of -0.0153 compared to the average, panels with all male
judges had a decrease in mean holding of -0.148, and panels with all white judges had a decrease
in mean holding of -0.188. Parallel to my findings in Table 1, this means that the smallest
difference in mean holdings was among panels categorized by immigrant status while the greatest
difference in mean holding was among panels categorized by race.
Next, I investigate whether these differences in panel voting behaviors can be interpreted
as the causal effect of panels having minority representation. To do this, I fit two models that
regressed panels’ votes on multiple panel-level characteristics. Model 1 is a limited regression that
only looks at whether panels had at least one minority judge based on gender, race, party affiliation,
and foreign-born judges. Model 2 looks at the effects of having specific numbers of female judges,
immigrant judges, judges of color, and Democrats presiding in panels. Table 3 shows the results
of this logit analysis.
Model 1 demonstrates that having at least one female judge and at least one judge of color
in immigration cases has panel effects on the case’s holding. That is, panels with at least one racial
or gender minority were both more likely to hold in favor of the immigrant appellant, making the
panel effect of racial and gender minorities pro-immigrant. My principal interest was in the effects
on holding of at least one foreign-born judge. Model 1 shows that panels with immigrant judges
were slightly more likely to hold in favor of the immigrant appellant than panels with all U.S.-born
judges, but not at a statistically significant level, so a causal relationship cannot be inferred. Model
2 reaffirms the finding that the presence of foreign-born judges does not have a causal panel effect
in immigration cases, as well as the finding that panels with a judge of color are more likely to be
pro-immigrant. I also find that panels with one Democrat and two Republicans decreases the
likelihood of granting the petition, making these panels more anti-immigrant and signaling that
ideology impacts panel outcomes.
In Appendix Table A2, I performed a logit analysis for the interaction effects between
foreign-born judges and judges of color, Democrats, and females. This table again demonstrates
panel effects for panels with at least one judge of color and at least one female judge, confirming
my results in Table 3, but did not find any significant interaction effects, meaning that neither the
race, gender, nor party of immigrant judges drove changes in their panels’ holdings.
Finally, I did another logit analysis to determine whether the regional origin of the appellant
made a difference in panels’ voting behaviors. I did not find this to be the case because, as is shown
in Appendix Table A3, there were no statistically significant results. This indicates that the region
of the appellant did not have a causal effect on the holdings of their cases.
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Table 3: Logit Analysis of Panels’ Voting
Model 1

Model 2

_____________
___________
Panel Composition

Coefficien
t

Intercept

-1.205

At Least
Judge

One

Foreign-Born 0.021

SE

Coefficient

SE

0.90
9

-1.304

0.9
29

0.37
4

0.523

0.4
35

At Least One Female Judge

0.625*

0.35
5

—

—

One Female Judge

—

—

0.591

0.3
74

—

—

0.147

0.5
07

At Least One Judge of Color

0.816**

0.36
1

—

—

One Judges of Color

—

—

0.878*

0.4
06

—

—

0.234

0.5
17

At Least One Democrat Judge

-0.52

0.91
8

—

—

One Democrat Judge

—

—

-2.15**

1.0
86

—

—

-0.017

0.9
53

—

—

0.526

0.9
64

(And Two Male Judges)

Two Female Judges
(And One Male Judge)

(And Two White Judges)

Two Judges of Color
(And One White Judge)

(And Two Republican Judges)

Two Democrat Judges
(And One Republican Judge)

All Democrat Judges

N = 200
** denotes p < 0.05, * denotes p < 0.1
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Discussion
Despite the theoretical expectation that foreign-born judges would affect panel-level
decisions, my research did not substantiate this assertion. On the contrary, based on my data, the
presence of foreign-born judges on panels had no significant pro-immigrant effect on the holdings
of U.S. Court of Appeals immigration cases. Specifically, although mean holdings were more proimmigrant among panels with foreign-born judges compared to all U.S.-born panels, the difference
in means could not be interpreted as causal (Table 3). Even though this finding is categorized as
null, as pointed out in previous literature, it is imperative that null findings be highlighted. 44 In
this study, my null result contributes to our understanding of the influence of minorities in the
federal judiciary by suggesting that immigrant judges do not introduce pro-appellant preference in
immigration cases.
While this paper’s central focus was on foreign-born judges, I also replicated previous
findings by testing whether gender and race contribute to panel effects. My results show that racial
and gender minorities do have panel effects on immigration holdings. In particular, I found that
female judges increased the likelihood that panels would vote pro-immigrant, which is consistent
with previous findings.45 However, regarding race, the finding that judges of color also increased
the likelihood of a panel holding pro-immigrant is not consistent with the findings of Williams and
Law (2012), which found that panels with racial minorities were more anti-immigrant.46 This
discrepancy could be due to a number of methodological differences including the sample size and
different date ranges, which I discuss further in my limitations section.
Taken together, my results suggest that the identity of being foreign-born influences judges
during voting and deliberation differently than do racial and/or gender identities. This could be
explained by findings in the literature indicating that immigrants, especially those who have
become naturalized in their host countries, may tend to hold anti-immigration views.47 In the
process of acquiring citizenship, immigrants acculturate, increasing their nationalist sentiments. 48
As a result, these naturalized citizens report higher than expected anti-immigration attitudes and
favor restrictive immigration policies. Thus, although we expect that shared experiences would
lead naturalized immigrants to have favorable attitudes towards immigration, research shows that
acculturation into the host country produces more critical views on immigration. 49
Another potential explanation for my null result hinges on the idea that foreign-born judges
may feel they are under more scrutiny during immigration cases, so they conform their views to
the majority opinion.50 Furthermore, immigrant judges may also want to avoid being tokenized for
their identity, which could compel them to not be as vocal as they might otherwise have been
during deliberations for immigration cases. 51 Thus, perceived notions about immigrant judges may
alter their behavior during deliberation, making them less likely to share pro-immigrant sentiments
and in turn reducing their panel effects in the Court of Appeals.
Finally, immigrant judges may have different voting patterns than female judges and judges
of color due to selection bias, or “systematic differences in how the considered populations were
put together.”52 As demonstrated in Appendix Table A2, I did not find any interaction effects
between holdings of panels with at least one immigrant and race, gender, or party affiliation, which
suggests that these factors are not driving my null result. However, in using the party of the
President that nominated each judge as a proxy for judge ideology, I did not fully capture their
political attitudes towards immigration. Further, the fact that all of the foreign-born judges have
become U.S. citizens and have received a high enough level of education to become a federal judge
suggests that the immigrant judges in the Court of Appeals are not wholly representative of all
U.S. immigrants, which may account for the discrepancy in their theoretically expected behaviors.
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A comprehensive interpretation of my null result takes into account that the sample of
immigrant judges in the Court of Appeals may (1) have anti-immigrant views independent of their
political party, (2) are less insistent in immigration cases to avoid scrutiny, and/or (3) have
experiences with immigration not representative of the average U.S. immigrant. While I believe
all of these frameworks could in part explain why immigrant judges do not cause panel effects,
this requires further research.
Limitations & Future Directions
The external validity of my research is limited in view of a small sample size (N=200).
With a limited sample size, my dataset only included 15 dissents out of 600 total votes, which is
insufficient to properly analyze individual-level differences in voting. Further, my dataset included
only one case in which an immigrant judge dissented, so it cannot be used as a proxy for foreignborn individual votes. Previous papers with larger databases were able to determine individual
effects of race and gender, among other variables, because their data included more dissents. As a
result of being unable to compare individual voting patterns, my research is unable to untangle the
causal mechanisms driving panel effects. Data on individual voting trends from foreign-born
judges compared to U.S.-born judges would have allowed me to determine whether judges’ votes
were endogenously affecting panel outcomes. Future research should focus on strategies to
uncover casual mechanisms by constructing a larger dataset containing more dissent cases.
It is also important to note that in this paper I used the terms “immigrant judge” and
“foreign-born judge” interchangeably. However, the immigrant experience is highly nuanced and
simply looking at birthplace is not a direct determinant of the personal experiences had by foreignborn judges. In addition, there is a dearth of information on the paths to citizenship taken by the
immigrant judges in my dataset, so the nuance of their experiences was not captured in my
research. Thus, grouping all foreign-born judges together may be an oversimplification. In order
to increase internal validity and uncover new findings in future studies, researchers should include
more comprehensive variables regarding judges’ backgrounds and upbringings (e.g., at what age
the judge immigrated to the U.S., whether their immigration case was ever appealed, whether they
encountered other barriers to citizenship, the number of family members who are also immigrants,
etc.).
Conclusion
Despite the limitations of my research, this study advances our understanding on the effects
of a neglected form of minority representation in the federal judiciary. With the recent emphasis
on immigration policy and voting patterns of minority judges, it is imperative to continue this line
of research into panel-level effects of U.S. Court of Appeals cases. The finding that the presence
of immigrant judges has no effect on the holding of an immigrant appellant importantly contradicts
notions that immigrant judges cannot be objective in immigration cases. However, the panel effects
of race and gender that were found in this research should not be taken to mean that minority
judges are less objective than nonminority judges. Rather, these judges bring a unique and useful
perspective to panels, making them an essential fixture of the federal bench.
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Appendix Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Mea
n

Min

Hispanic Defendant

0.61

0

1

All White Judges

0.36

0

1

One Judge of Color

0.42

0

1

0.20
5

0

1

0.01
5

0

1

0.24

0

1

All Male Judges

0.31

0

1

One Female Judge

0.5

0

1

0.17
5

0

1

0.01
5

0

1

All Republican Judges

0.03

0

1

One Democrat Judge

0.25

0

1

0.36

0

1

0.36

0

1

Variable

Max

Race

(And Two White Judges)

Two Judges of Color
(And One White Judge)

All Judges of Color
Immigration
At Least One Foreign-Born
Judge
Gender

(And Two Male Judges)

Two Female Judges
(And One Male Judge)

All Female Judges
Party Affiliation

(And Two Republican Judges)

Two Democrat Judges
(And One Republican Judge)

All Democrat Judges
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Holding

0.53
5

0

2

N = 200

Variable

Coefficie
nt

At Least One Immigrant Judge

0.384
(0.726)

At Least One Judge of Color

0.25*
(0.133)

At Least One Democrat Judge

0.378
(0.476)

At Least One Female Judge

0.239*
(0.144)

Immigrant × Judge of Color

0.413
(0.459)

Immigrant × Democrat

-0.711
(0.703)

Immigrant × Female

-0.139
(0.296)
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Appendix Table A2: Logit Analysis of Panel Characteristics’ Interaction Effects

Variable

Coeffic
ient

At Least One Immigrant Judge

0.384
(0.726)

At Least One Judge of Color

0.25*
(0.133)

At Least One Democrat Judge

0.378
(0.476)

At Least One Female Judge

0.239*
(0.144)

Immigrant ´ Judge of Color

0.413
(0.459)

Immigrant ´ Democrat

-0.711
(0.703)

Immigrant ´ Female

-0.139
(0.296)

Appendix Table A3: Logit Analysis of Regional Differences in Appeals Court Decisions

Region of
Appellant

Coefficient

European
Latin American

SE

p-value

-0.336

0.585

0.565

-0.418

0.616

0.497
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East Asian
Middle Eastern
African

-0.012

0.696

0.986

0.49

0.807

0.543

-1.609

0.851

0.058
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